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I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent should fairness considerations drive energy policy?
This basic question underlies much of the current debate over the net
metering programs and related policies that have propelled record growth
in the rooftop solar industry over the past decade. Utilities are increasingly
calling for reforms to these programs, claiming that they are unfair in one
way or another.
Fairness is a notoriously fuzzy concept capable of describing a wide
range of distinct policy ideals. Unless they are properly managed, general
claims of unfairness can thus confuse and distract decision-makers in their
attempts to address complicated regulatory challenges. In light of these
risks, how should policymakers respond to the various fairness arguments
arising in the ongoing struggle over disruptive innovation in the nation’s
energy sector?
This Article analyzes the primary fairness arguments that utilities are
leveling against net metering programs and electricity rate designs as
rooftop solar energy expands across the country. By categorizing and more
thoroughly evaluating these arguments, this Article seeks to enhance the
dialogue between utilities, legislators, state regulators, and the solar
energy industry over how to best orchestrate the nation’s shift toward
more sustainable electricity strategies.
Part II of this Article describes how net metering programs and other
factors are spurring dramatic growth in distributed solar energy generation
in the United States and how utilities are increasingly lobbying for policy
changes that would slow this trend. Part III highlights the conspicuous
role that simple fairness arguments are playing in utilities’ campaigns against
distributed energy-friendly policies. Part III also describes research by
Professor Steven Shavell and Professor Louis Kaplow that questions the
propriety of fairness arguments in policy analysis. Shavell and Kaplow
argue that claims of unfairness can be counterproductive distractions in
the formulation of policy and thus recommend that decision-makers
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thoroughly examine fairness-based arguments before allowing them to
shape legislative, regulatory, or judicial decisions. Part IV of this Article
seeks to apply these scholars’ approach, analyzing fairness-based arguments
against net metering and existing rate designs as they relate to three distinct
groups: (i) utility customers who have no solar panels, (ii) utility customers
with low incomes, and (iii) utilities themselves.
This Article ultimately argues that general appeals to fairness are
detrimental in policy debates involving distributed solar energy. Shunning
fairness arguments in favor of clearer, more specific arguments would
benefit decision-makers as they search for solutions to the complex policy
challenges associated with transitioning to a more sustainable electricity
system.
II. DISTRIBUTED SOLAR ENERGY: UTILITIES’ EXISTENTIAL THREAT?
Throughout much of the United States today, rooftop solar energy
installations have become a sound financial investment for real property
owners. Falling prices for photovoltaic (“PV”) solar panels1 and various
government incentive programs2 have vaulted rooftop solar energy from
a small niche industry into a booming business in many regions of the
country.3
A. The Powerful Effects of Net Metering
Net metering programs have arguably been more effective than any
other type of policy at promoting the growth of distributed solar energy in

1. See Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a
Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 5 (2014) (noting that “PV systems
present increasingly viable alternatives to conventional retail electric utility service in parts
of the United States”) (citing Black & Veatch, 2013 Strategic Direction in the U.S. Electric
Utility Industry 42–43 (2013).
2. For an exhaustive compilation of links to state incentive programs and policies
relating to solar energy, visit the U.S. Department of Energy’s DSIRE Solar Portal at http://
www.dsireusa.org/solar/.
3. For information on the dramatic growth of solar energy over the past several
years, see GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Association, Solar Market Insight Report
(2014 Q1), http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-report-2014-q1
(“The U.S. installed 1,330 MWdc of solar PV in Q1 2014, up 79% over Q1 2013, making
it the second-largest quarter for solar installations in the history of the market”).
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the United States.4 Although net metering programs vary across jurisdictions,
most of them essentially provide that, when a customer’s distributed
energy system generates more power than the customer needs on site, that
extra electricity flows onto the grid and the customer’s meter effectively
runs backward.5 In most jurisdictions, net-metered customers get credits
from their utility at retail electricity rates for excess power that their
distributed energy systems generate.6 Such customers thus typically pay
only for whatever quantity of power they consumed during a month or
year that exceeded what their renewable energy systems produced over
that period.
For obvious reasons, net metering programs significantly lower the
electricity bills of utility customers with rooftop PV systems. Particularly
in sunny markets where retail electricity rates are high, these potential cost
savings are beginning to make purchasing a solar array an attractive
financial investment. In these markets, distributed PV is rapidly reaching
“grid parity” with conventional electricity sources—a degree of costcompetitiveness that solar energy advocates only dreamed about just a few
short years ago.7 Solar leasing and special financing arrangements are
even allowing citizens who cannot afford to pay cash for rooftop PV systems
to go solar with little or no money down.8 In light of these developments,
it is hardly surprising that solar arrays are appearing on more and more
rooftops across the country.
B. Utilities’ Growing Campaign Against Net Metering Programs and
Other Policies Favoring Rooftop Solar Energy
As exciting as the rapid rise of distributed solar energy has been
for companies within that industry, some utilities seem to take a less
enthusiastic view of these changes. As rooftop solar development
4. See ABA Environment, Energy and Resources Law Energy and Resource
Committee, Renewable, Alternative, and Distributed Energy Resources, 2013 ABA ENV’T
ENERGY, & RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV. 264, 270 (2013) (stating that net metering was
“still the primary policy driver supporting residential solar installations” in 2013) [hereinafter
ABA Environment, Energy and Resources Law Energy and Resource Committee, Year in
Review].
5. See Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to
Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712, 1727 (2014) (describing the basics
elements of most net metering programs).
6. See Robert E. Curry, Jr., The Law of Unintended Consequences, 151 NO. 3 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 44, 47 (2013) (noting that, in “most jurisdictions,” a net metering customer’s
meter runs “backward at the full, bundled retail rate”).
7. See Giles Parkinson, Solar Grid Party in All 50 States by 2015, Predicts
Deutsche Bank, CLEANTECHNICA.COM (Oct. 29, 2014), available at http://cleantechnica.com/
2014/10/29/solar-grid-parity-us-states-2016-says-deutsche-bank/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
8. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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becomes more commonplace, it is likely to dampen demand for gridsupplied power and thereby cut into utilities’ profits.9 Concerned about
these and other impacts, a growing number of utilities have begun actively
seeking to weaken or eliminate net metering programs within their
territories. 10
1. A Utility Death Spiral?
From the perspective of regulated utilities, net metering and distributed
energy technologies can represent a growing threat to the comfortable
business model under which they have operated for decades. Utilities’
concerns about the potential long-term consequences of net metering are
often encapsulated in what has come to be known as the “death spiral”
scenario.11 When only a tiny fraction of a utility’s customers have solar
panels, most utilities can absorb these customers’ impacts on their finances
and day-to-day operations. But as its quantity of solar-using, net-metered
customers grows, a utility sells less and less power and its revenue stream
begins to shrink. To compensate for this drop in revenue, utilities typically
must petition to increase the per-unit price of the electricity they sell.
Unfortunately, these rate increases only make the relative price of distributed
solar energy seem more attractive to utility customers. Additional customers

9. See Christopher Martin, Solar to Reduce Utility Profits in Five Years, Fitch
Says, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-18/solarto-reduce-utility-profits-in-five-years-fitch-says.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (describing a
recent study predicting that “[r]ooftop solar power and energy-efficiency programs will
eat into utility revenue and profit margins and discourage investment in new transmission
projects within five years”).
10. For information on utilities’ recent efforts to reform net metering and rate designs in
response to the growth of distributed solar energy, see infra notes 16–33 and accompanying
text.
11. The utility death spiral concept has been articulated in countless articles in
recent years, only a few of which are listed here. See Graffy & Kihm, supra note 1, at 2 (“The
characterization of renewable energy innovations, such as rooftop solar as a . . .‘death
spiral’ reflects an awareness that unconventional risks have emerged”); Diane Cardwell,
On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/07/27/business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-fresh-threat-do-it-yourselfpower.html?_r=0 (observing that, “as utilities put a heavier burden on fewer customers, it
increases the appeal for them to turn their roofs over to solar panels,” and that “Utility
executives call this a ‘death spiral’”); Liam Denning, Lights Flicker for Utilities, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013) (describing Wall Street fears of a “looming ‘death spiral’” for
utilities, “with solar power being the culprit”).
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are thus enticed to get solar panels of their own, causing utilities to suffer
even further revenue declines.
As solar arrays appear on more and more rooftops within a given area,
a utility’s daily task of balancing load supply and demand on the electricity
grid also becomes more difficult. In addition to ramping centralized
power plants up or down in response to shifts in load demand, utilities
operating in territories with large numbers of rooftop solar installations
have to also predict and respond to changes in the amount of power that
these systems supply into the grid. Balancing loads in a grid with thousands
of rooftop solar energy systems requires estimating how productive all of
these customer-controlled systems will be at any given moment—a chore
that can be particularly difficult on partly cloudy days when the amount
and intensity of sunlight in a region is constantly in flux.12 Further rate
increases are often the only feasible way for utilities to fund the expensive
grid upgrades needed to address the new load management challenges
associated with distributed solar power. Of course, rate increases aimed at
covering these additional costs only motivate more customers to invest in
their own solar arrays.
This vicious cycle of declining utility revenues, rising electricity rates,
and shrinking demand for grid-supplied power could theoretically spiral
on and on until nearly every customer has rooftop solar panels or some
other distributed energy system. At that point, electric utilities would
devolve into mere suppliers of high-priced, temporary backup electricity.
Retail rates for that backup power would have to be astronomically high
for utilities to recoup their costs under such a model, so small-scale distributed
energy storage or generators could likely become viable alternatives to
reliance on utilities.13 Insolvent and devoid of customers, conventional
utilities caught in such a world would quickly fade into extinction.
12. The additional challenges that distributed energy generation place on grid load
management are perhaps most famously illustrated through the California Independent
System Operator’s description of a “duck curve” reflecting hour-by-hour variations in
electricity supply and demand in California’s grid system. See generally California ISO,
Fast Facts: What the duck curve tells us about managing a green grid, available at
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/FlexibleResourcesHelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf
(last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (explaining how the rise of distributed energy sources creates
“different operating conditions that require flexible resource capabilities to ensure green
grid reliability”).
13. There is evidence that the trend of utility customers leaving the grid is already
beginning to gain steam in some markets. See Mark Chediak, He Ripped their House Off
the Grid, and He’s No Hippie, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2014), available at http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-30/getting-off-the-grid-in-hawaii-becoming-a-family-affair.
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (describing how small businesses in Hawaii are beginning
to supply equipment and expertise to help residents leave the grid and noting that SolarCity
Corp. and SunPower Corp. are offering solar and battery packages designed for that purpose
as well).
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2. Proposals to Slow or Stop the Spiral
Although the death spiral scenario just described is not likely to wipe
out most utilities anytime soon, net metering programs and the growing
rooftop solar energy industry are already whittling away at investor-owned
utilities’ profits and complicating utilities’ operations in some jurisdictions.14
Even in regions where solar panel installations are still relatively uncommon,
utilities seem to increasingly view net metering and distributed solar energy
as credible threats to their stability over the long term. Accordingly, more
and more utilities and their investors are now lobbying for reforms to net
metering programs and rate designs that would decelerate the growth of
distributed solar energy.
One reform strategy that some utilities have recently proposed involves
imposing special fees on utility customers that have solar panels. For
example, Arizona Public Service, Co. (“APS”), a large investor-owned
utility in Arizona, asked regulators in that state in 2013 to allow the utility
to impose fees of up to $100 per month on solar energy-using customers.15
Utilities have lobbied for similar fees in Georgia,16 Idaho,17 Utah,18

14. See supra note 9.
15. See Ryan Randazzo, APS seeks higher bills for new solar customers,
azcentral.com (July 12, 2013), available at http://www.azcentral.com/business/consumer/
free/20130712aps-seeks-higher-bills-new-solar-customers.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2014)
(reporting that “Arizona Public Service Co. is proposing charging customers who install
rooftop solar panels $50 to $100 or more a month to cover the cost of maintaining the
power grid”).
16. See Walter C. Jones, Georgia Power agrees to smaller rate increase, THE
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://chronicle.augusta.com/latestnews/2013-11-18/georgia-power-agrees-smaller-rate-hike?v=1384802802 (last visited Oct.
17, 2014) (describing Georgia Power’s decision to postpone its request for a monthly $22
fee on solar energy-using customers).
17. See Mark Jaffe, Rooftop solar net metering is being fought across U.S., THE
DENVER POST (Sept. 1, 2013), available at http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_2398
6631/rooftop-solar-net-metering-is-being-fought-across (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (mentioning
Idaho Power Co.’s proposal to quadruple the utility’s monthly service charge for rooftop
solar homes).
18. See Laura Seitz, Solar energy users claim victory as ‘sun tax’ rejected, DESERET
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2014), available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865609848/Solar
-energy-users-claim-victory-as-sun-tax-rejected.html?pg=all (last visited Sept. 23, 2014)
(describing Rocky Mountain Power’s request for a $4.65 monthly fee on residential rooftop
solar customers within its territory).
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Virginia,19 Vermont,20 and Wisconsin. 21 In most cases, these fees are
intended to apply only to customers with net-metered, on-site distributed
energy systems such as rooftop solar arrays.
Thus far, it appears that Arizona is the only state in which a utility has
begun actually imposing targeted fees on users of solar energy. Under
authorization from the Arizona Corporation Commission, APS now
generally charges residential customers fees of $0.70 per kilowatt of
installed PV generating capacity.22 For a typical 7-kilowatt solar array,
this fee amounts to less than $5.00 per month.23 However, the Commission’s
decision approving the fee specifies that APS customers whose solar arrays
are installed after January 1, 2014, must be presented with a document
stating that such fees could increase by any approved amount at any time.24
This potential for future fee increases on solar users creates added uncertainty
for customers in APS territory, and there is evidence that these reforms
are already slowing the rate of distributed solar energy installations among
APS customers.25 Salt River Project, another large Arizona utility, also
recently announced plans to impose special fees on customers with solar
energy systems.26
19. See Mike Gangloff, Appalachian Power’s proposed fee targets uses of solar
panels, ROANOKE TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), available at http://www.roanoke.com/news/local/
blacksburg/appalachian-power-s-proposed-fee-targets-users-of-solar-panels/article_16597740
-c251-5c3a-99e9-135dc19ae42c.html.
20. See Scott Gibson, Vermont Utility Seeks a New Solar Fee, GREENBUILDING
ADVISOR.COM (Jul. 11, 2014), available at http://www.greenbuildingadvisor.com/blogs/dept/green
-building-news/vermont-utility-seeks-new-solar-fee (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (highlighting
Washington Electric Cooperative’s proposal to charge a grid service fee of $0.463 cents
per kilowatt hour for all new net metered customers within its service area).
21. See Kiley Kroh, Push to Impose Extra Fees On Solar Customers Draws Outrage
In Wisconsin, THINKPROGRESS.O RG (Sept. 14, 2014, 11:46AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
climate/2014/09/14/3567244/utility-fees-end-wisconsin-solar/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(describing a plan recently submitted by the Wisconsin Utility “We Energies” to impose a
new monthly “demand charge” or $3.80 per kilowatt on owners of renewable energy systems).
22. See Diane Cardwell, Compromise in Arizona Defers a Solar Fight, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/business/energy-environment/compromisein-arizona-defers-a-solar-power-fight.html?_r=0.
23. See id.
24. See Ryan Randazzo, Commission votes to raise APS customers’ bills, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Nov. 14, 2013, 10 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/bu siness/arizonaeconomy/
articles/20131114aps-solar-customer-bills-higher.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
25. See Press Release, Marta Stoepker & Will Greene, Solar Installations Drop
After APS Assesses Charge to Solar Customers, SIERRACLUB.COM (Apr. 14, 2014), http://
content.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2014/04/solar-installations-drop-after-aps-assessescharge-solar-customers (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) explaining that the quantityof rooftop
solar energy installations in APS territory in the first quarter of 2014 was 40% lower than
in the first quarter of 2014).
26. See Ryan Randazzo, SRP’s proposed rate hike targets new rooftop-solar customers,
AZCENTRAL.COM (Dec. 1, 2014, 4:03PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/
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Proposals to reform utility rates in ways that increase the fixed portion
of customers’ monthly bills have also become common in recent years and
are similarly capable of curbing rooftop solar energy growth. Electricity rates
have historically been volumetric, meaning that the total amount that
customers owe on their electricity bills is based primarily upon the quantity
of electric power actually supplied to them over that billing period.27
However, a growing number of utilities are now seeking to make utility
rates less volumetric in nature. For instance, in 2014, California’s legislature
recently enacted a statute authorizing utilities to impose fixed fees of up
to ten dollars28 and a utility in Wisconsin received state commission
approval to increase its fixed monthly fee from nine dollars to sixteen
dollars.29
Unlike the solar-specific fees charged by APS, fixed customer fees are
paid by all customers, regardless of whether they have solar panels.
However, these fees can still weaken economic incentives for rooftop
solar because they increase the amount that customers must pay even if
they use no grid-supplied power over a given billing period. Moreover,
utilities tend to offset these large fixed fee increases with corresponding
decreases in per-kWh rates so as to avoid steep overall rate increases.
These reductions in the per-kWh price weaken customers’ incentives to
conserve electricity or to make buildings more energy efficient—two of
the most cost-effective means of reducing carbon dioxide emissions from
electric power.30

2014/12/01/srps-proposed-rate-hike-targets-new-rooftop-solar-customers/19753373/ (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014) (describing SRP’s proposed plan to impose fees of up to $50 per
month on customers who add rooftop solar panels to their homes).
27. See Jeff D. Mackholm, “Decoupling” for Energy Distributors: Changing 19th
Century Tariff Structures to Address 21st Century Energy Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 157,
161 (2008) (“In today’s market, with millions of household and small commercial gas and
electricity customers to serve, the pricing practices of most distributors are still restricted
to the volumetric pricing of the 19th and early 20th century for the simple reason that household
and small business meters still only measure the flowing gas and electricity supply”).
28. See Graffy & Kihm, supra note 1, at 11–12 (stating that the “California Legislature
set the upper bound on residential monthly fixed charges at $10”) (citation omitted).
29. See Thomas Content, Regulators agree to increase fixed charge on We Energy
electricity bills, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2014) (http://www.jsonline.com/
business/psc-begins-consideration-of-we-energies-rate-hike-plan-b99390765z1-282726581.
html (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
30. See, e.g., Sam Robinson, Note, The Carbon Dioxide Debate and Coal Plant
Permitting in Virginia, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 300 (2010) (Citing
a study finding that “[e]nergy conservation and efficiency improvements offer Virginia
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In addition to the two fee-based reform strategies just described, utilities
have advocated for several other types of policy changes in the past few
years that adversely impact distributed solar energy. For example, some
utilities have sought to reduce amounts credited to net-metered customers
for the excess power they feed onto the grid.31 An investor-owned utility
in Colorado sought to more strictly limit the aggregate amount of distributed
energy generating capacity that it must accept into its net metering program.32
And Kansas legislators enacted a bill in 2014 that reduced the maximum
size of distributed energy systems that were eligible for enrollment in net
metering.33
Recent efforts to limit rooftop solar energy and weaken net metering
programs represent a startling shift in the general policy approach toward
distributed solar energy. Federal, state, and local governments have been
actively promoting distributed solar energy through tax credits, subsidies,
rebates, and other government incentives for years.34 Such policies have
long served as means of addressing perceived positive externality problems
that would have otherwise led to sub-optimally low rates of solar
installations.35 Seemingly overnight, solar-friendly policies are now being

the most cost-effective means of decreasing carbon emissions” associated with electricity
production and consumption in that state) (citation omitted).
31. For example, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission recently approved
such changes under a request from We Energies, a large investor-owned utility in that
state. See Thomas Content, Regulators agree to increase fixed charge on We Energy
electricity bills, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2014) http://www.jsonline.com/
business/psc-begins-consideration-of-we-energies-rate-hike-plan-b99390765z1-82726581.
html (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (stating that, under a newly released Public Service
Commission decision, We Energies would be authorized to “pay less for the power that
customers generate with solar panels”).
32. Xcel Energy, an investor-owned utility in Colorado, is an example of a utility
that has recently advocated for more aggressive caps on net metering. See ABA Environment,
Energy and Resources Law Energy and Resource Committee, Year in Review, supra note
4, at 270.
33. See Karen Uhlenhuth, In defeat for ALEC, Kansas lawmakers pass net metering
plan, MIDWEST E NERGY N EWS (Apr. 7, 2014) (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (describing
newly-enacted legislation in Kansas providing that only residential solar energy installations
with generating capacities of 15 kilowatts or less may qualify for net metering in that
state).
34. An exhaustive compilation of links to state incentive programs and policies
relating to solar energy, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY , http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/.
35. See Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and
Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 172–73 (2005), available at http://www.
rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-04-38.pdf (referring to solar energy as providing positive
externalities). (quoted in Paul Boudreaux, Carrots and Sticks, from President Obama’s
Solyndra and Beyond, 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 1, 41 (2013), available
at http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Journal%20of%20Energy,%20Climate,%20and%20the%20
Environment/6-Boudreaux.pdf).
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replaced with limitations and fees that are likely to slow the pace of
distributed solar energy growth.
III. FAIRNESS AS AN ARGUMENT IN POLICY ANALYSIS
Notions of fairness are woven throughout utilities’ nationwide movement
to limit net metering and reform electricity rate designs in response to
distributed solar energy. Why has the concept of fairness emerged as a
driving force in utilities’ recent push for reforms? And is this emphasis
on fairness sensible, or should it be cause for concern?
A. Utilities’ Focus on Fairness
Utilities across the country are increasingly appealing to fairness when
advocating for reforms to net metering programs or rate designs that
would weaken incentives for rooftop solar energy. APS made fairness a
focal point of its successful bid for permission to impose targeted fees on
solar-using customers. Throughout its public relations campaign, APS
emphasized the need for greater fairness as its primary motivation for
seeking reforms. The following quote from the APS Manager of Renewable
Energy typified the utility’s message:
We love customers to go solar; the energy is a great resource as part of our energy
portfolio. But this is about cost shifting and fairness. . .We’re trying to find a
way to fairly compensate solar users for power they generate but also have them
fairly pay the price for the grid they are still connected to.36

Other investor-owned utilities throughout the country have made very
similar sorts of arguments in connection with their own reform proposals.
For instance, a spokesperson for Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. discussing
that utility’s push for net metering reform explained, “We’re not anti-solar
or anti-wind or trying to slow this down, we’re just trying to keep it fair.”37
And the Wisconsin utility “We Energies” characterized its recent rate
reform proposal as “a path to renewable energy fairness.”38
36. Kristine Harrington, APS seeks to charge new solar customers more, azfamily.
com (July 16, 2013) (italics added), available at http://www.azfamily.com/news/APS-seeksto-charge-new-solar-customers-more-215759191.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
37. Kiley Kroh, Oklahoma Will Charge Customers Who Install Their Own Solar
Panels, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Apr. 16, 2014, 3:37 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/clim
ate/2014/04/16/3427392/oklahoma-fee-solar-wind/ (emphasis added).
38. See Path to Renewable Energy Fairness, WE ENERGIES, http://www.we-energies.
com/renewable_energy_fairness/clarifications_corrections.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
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B. Using Fairness to Defend a Conservative Policy Position?
Utilities’ heavy reliance on fairness arguments to advocate for policies
that would slow rooftop energy development is in some sense surprising.
After all, fairness arguments tend to be most frequently employed by leftleaning parties to challenge capitalistic policy strategies. The ideals of
efficiency and fairness are often characterized as being inherently at odds39:
conservative policy positions frequently have some grounding in utilitarian
principles, while progressive positions tend to give greater consideration
to notions of justice and equity.
How, then, have advocates of distributed solar energy—a seemingly
progressive bunch—suddenly found themselves on the opposite side of a
fairness debate? And what, if anything, might we learn from this unusual
dynamic?
C. The Potential Disadvantages of Fairness Arguments
in Policy Discussions
Utilities may rely on fairness arguments to challenge distributed solar
energy merely because they believe such arguments will resonate well
among the general public. However, their emphasis on fairness may be
hindering policymakers’ efforts to facilitate a smooth national transition
toward cleaner, distributed energy sources. As the following discussion
describes, fairness arguments can often oversimplify complex questions
and lead to rash or unjustifiable policy decisions.
Fairness is a concept that pervades human culture and is among the first
ideals that infants grasp in early stages of child development.40 It is thus
hardly surprising that idealistic references to fairness appear throughout
modern law, from fair trade to fair housing to fair labor practices. As
evidenced by a recently published book that compiles dozens of top rate
academic articles on the topic, there is also a vast and rich set of academic

39. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics:
An Introduction1 (U. OF CHI. COASE-SANDOR INST. FOR L. & ECON., Working Paper No.
704, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2504819
[hereinafter Fennell & McAdams, Fairness in Law & Economics] (noting that “The relationship
between fairness and the economic concept of efficiency is usually cast as an adversarial
one”) (citation omitted).
40. See, e.g., Marco F. H. Schmidt & Jessica A. Sommerville, Fairness Expectations
and Altruistic Sharing in 15-Month-Old Human Infants, 6 PLOS ONE 1 (2011) (describing
a live human study concluding that infants begin developing a sense fairness as soon as 15
months after birth).
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scholarship devoted to notions of fairness and their place in legal
discourse.41
Notions of fairness undoubtedly have value in some contexts as a firstorder means of identifying issues relating to justice, equality, or impartiality,42
and some other policy ideals.43 Claims that a particular proposal or rule
would be unfair can sometimes help draw attention to certain policy impacts
that are difficult to articulate and thus might otherwise go unnoticed.44
However, because such a wide variety of policy impacts can conceivably
be classified as unfair, appeals to notions of fairness can also breed confusion
and mislead decision-makers. The lack of a clear, singular definition of
fairness can make fairness a difficult standard to pursue since stakeholders
often have disparate views about what achieving fairness might look like
in a given context.45 And ambiguities embedded in the word “fair” make
it particularly prone to manipulation. Consider, for example, how one scholar
critiqued the use of the phrase “fair trade” in academic and political circles:
Fair trade means a moral canonization of pure political arbitrariness . . . Fair trade
in practice consists of politically anointing certain domestic economic interests,
and then commandeering the machinery of the state to enforce the political
dictate. To achieve fair trade requires constant bureaucratic and political
manipulation and continual revision of the definition of fairness. The definition of
fair trade has become trade controlled by politicians and bureaucrats.46

Despite the numerous shortcomings associated with the concept of
fairness, framing a policy as fair often imbues it with a stamp of correctness
41. See generally FAIRNESS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lee Anne Fennell & Richard
H. McAdams, eds., Edward Elgar Pub. 2013).
42. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (9th ed. 2009) 271 (defining “fair” as
“[i]mpartial; just; equitable; disinterested” and alternatively defining it to mean “[f]ree
of bias or prejudice”).
43. See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 20–24 (2000) (describing five distinct conceptions
of “fairness” present in fair labor law).
44. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 1315 (2001). (“Notions of fairness are like other intuitions and instincts:
they may suggest a tentative answer to questions, motivate inquiry in useful directions,
and serve as a check against the tendency to accept too readily new and intriguing yet
untested ideas”).
45. See, e.g., James R. Kearl, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 607 (1993) (Noting that it
is “not clear how ‘fairness’ should be defined” and that “whether we judge what we
observe to be fair or unfair depends on what we believe ‘fairness’ means”).
46. James Bovard, The Morality of Protectionism, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
235, 247–48 (1993). Fairness has likewise taken on several different definitions in the
context of fair labor laws. See generally source cited supra note 43.
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or “moral superiority.”47 Many people seem to inherently favor what they
perceive to be the fairest policy or outcome and to give less weight to all
other considerations. Some scholars have speculated that this inclination
may be partly due to close ties between humans’ conceptions of fairness
and their shared system of social norms.48 Regardless, humans’ ingrained
bias in favor of what they perceive to be fair can make appeals to fairness
a powerful means of influencing public sentiment on a controversial issue.
Published research by Professors Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow has
brought significant attention to the concept of fairness within legal academic
circles over the past two decades.49 In essence, these renowned scholars
argue that policies should be evaluated based “exclusively on their effects
on individuals’ welfare” with “no independent weight” given to “conceptions
of fairness.”50 In part because of the potential hazards described above,
they recommend proceeding cautiously when encountering fairness arguments
in policy discourse. To quote Shavell and Kaplow:
[W]hen a particular result seems fair or unfair to us, we should . . . explore the
problem, both analytically and empirically, and also reflect on our notion of fairness
. . . In some instances, we will thereby identify important considerations that we
might otherwise have omitted from our analysis. At other times, we will find . . .
our notion of fairness to be misleading . . . [A] common phenomenon is that the
notion of fairness reflects one important factor in a situation but ignores others.”51

The pervasive use of fairness arguments in the current debate over net
metering and solar energy warrants an application of the Shavell and
Kaplow approach—a closer, more rigorous look at what truly lies behind
47. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1308 (2001).
48. See id. at 1308–09 (suggesting that humans’ strong tendency to favor policy
options that they perceive to be fair is at least partly “due to the correspondence between
notions of fairness and norms of common morality that have been instilled in everyone”).
49. See generally Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of
Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical
Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001). Kaplow’s and Shavell’s thoughtful economic analysis
of the concept of fairness makes for a fascinating read but unfortunately goes well beyond
the scope of this short article.
50. Id. at 966. It should be noted that focusing on individuals’ welfare does not
equate to ignoring social preferences in favor of such values as non-discrimination or
equality that that are sometimes framed in terms of fairness. Theorists have clarified that
these preferences are to be factored in when formulating the social welfare function. See
Anne Fennell McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics, supra note 39, at 1–2 (observing
that “fairness is often concerned with distribution, and a social welfare function (SWF)
can be structured to value certain distributions. A utilitarian SWF seeks to maximize the
sum of individual utilities, but welfare theory is also consistent with the selection of a SWF
that would put some independent weight on achieving equality of welfare across individuals”).
51. Id. at 1315–16.
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these fairness claims. What specific impacts are utilities referring to when
they assert that policies such as net metering and existing rate structures
are unfair? And do these impacts create a need for major policy reforms,
or are they outweighed by other countervailing factors? Closely examining
these fairness arguments is the only effective mean of evaluating their true
merits.
IV. THE PRIMARY FAIRNESS ARGUMENTS AGAINST POLICIES
FAVORING DISTRIBUTED SOLAR ENERGY
Fairness arguments leveled against net metering programs and existing
rate designs come in various forms and involve several different classes
of parties. However, such claims tend to implicate three primary categories
of victims: (i) utility customers who have no solar panels, (ii) utility customers
with low incomes, and (iii) utilities themselves.
A. Unfairness Toward Customers Without Rooftop Solar Energy
Systems: The “Fair Share” Argument
The most common fairness-based argument raised against solar net
metering is that it allows utility customers with rooftop PV systems to
“free ride” off of other customers who do not have solar panels.52 Numerous
utilities and their allies have asserted that net metering programs and
existing rate structures allow customers with solar energy systems to make
use of the electric grid as a back-up power source without paying their
“fair share” of the costs of building and maintaining it.53

52. Free riding is among the most basic concepts in microeconomic theory. See
Kearl, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, supra note 45, at 441 (“Free riding occurs when a person
benefits from or uses a valuable good or service without having to pay for it”).
53. See, e.g., Kroh, supra note 21 (quoting a Wisconsin utility’s spokesperson as
saying that “Under the current rates, [solar users] really don’t pay their fair share of grid
operating costs”); William Pentland, Why the net metering fight is a red herring for
utilities, UTILITYDIVE.COM (Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/
why-the-net-metering-fight-is-a-red-herring-for-utilities/307061/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014)
(quoting the Edison Foundation’s Institute for Electric Innovation as arguing that reforms
were needed to help ensure that distributed generation customers “pay their fair share of
the cost of the grid”); Bobby Magill, Okla. Utilities Hit Homes Using Solar with Extra
Fee, CLIMATECENTRAL.ORG (Apr. 22, 2014), available at http://www.climatecentral.org/
news/oklahoma-solar-surcharge-bill-becomes-law-17335 (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (quoting
Oklahoma Gas and Electric spokeswoman Kathleen O’Shea as arguing that her company
merely wants to “make sure everybody who’s using the grid is paying their fair share”).
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1. What Does Paying a “Fair Share” of Grid Costs Mean?
As mentioned above, utility customers in most jurisdictions pay primarily
volumetric rates for their electricity: the amount due on their monthly
electricity bill is based largely upon the number of kilowatt hours (kWh)
they consume over the billing period.54 Utilities tend to recoup most of
the variable and fixed costs associated with electricity production and
distribution by charging customers for their actual consumption of gridsupplied power.55
When utility customers install new solar arrays on their rooftops and
enroll in net metering programs, the quantity of grid-sourced electricity
they consume each period typically shrinks to a mere fraction of its former
amount. Under utilities’ typical volumetric electricity rate structure, this
decline in the net quantity of delivered power translates into much lower
power bills for customers with distributed solar energy systems.56 However,
such customers still rely regularly on the electric grid for backup power
when the sun is not shining enough to satisfy their energy needs.
Eventually, utilities must seek increases to their electricity rates to
enable them to maintain the same basic grid infrastructure while selling
less power. The monthly electricity bills paid by non-solar-using customers
go up as a result of these rate increases, while customers with solar panels
experience much smaller bill increases. Because solar users still depend
on the grid but pay far less than other utility customers pay, some electric
utilities have claimed that solar energy users do not pay their “fair share”
of the grid costs.57
54. See Mackholm, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
55. See Curry, supra note 6 (explaining that the “current regulatory model provides
recovery of most fixed costs through volumetric (kWh) rates for residential and small
business customers. Fixed costs are part of allowed revenue requirements, which are
spread over the average per-customer kWh sales established in the test year for mass market
customers”).
56. Net metering programs greatly amplify these savings. See, e.g., Josh Cornfeld,
How Much Money Will California Customers Save with Net Metering?, GREENTECHMEDIA.COM
(Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-muchmoney-will-california-solar-customers-save-with-net-metering (last visited Nov. 22,
2014) (estimating that, “with net energy metering at the retail rate, the solar system
saves each of the model customers $700 to $1,000 more on their annual electricity bill
compared to the scenario with no net energy metering at all, equivalent to savings of
an additional 54 percent to 85 percent”).
57. Numerous utilities and advocates have made this argument. See, e.g., David Fladeboe,
Memo: All Should Pay for their Fair Share of the Electric Grid, AMERICANSFORPROSPERITY.ORG
(Sept. 15, 2014), available at http://americansforprosperity.org/wisconsin/newsroom/memo
-all-should-pay-for-their-fair-share-of-the-electric-grid/ (“Solar customers . . . should
have to pay their fair share for the grid that they use as much, if not more, than the rest of
us”); Melanie Turner, Utilities: solar customers don’t pay fair share, SACRAMENTO BUS.
J.
(Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/print-
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2. A More Descriptive Label: Cross-Subsidization
Utilities’ “fair share” arguments against solar users can be alternatively
described as arguments against cross-subsidization. To the extent that they
compel utilities to raise electricity rates, net metering and existing rate
designs can potentially create cross-subsidies in favor of solar energy users.
One stakeholder has compared such purported subsidies to subsidies
enjoyed by owners of electric cars who regularly use public roads but do
not buy gasoline and thus avoid paying the gasoline taxes that fund much
of a jurisdiction’s road construction and maintenance.58 Drivers of electric
cars are arguably able to use public roads without paying their fair share
of the costs associated with road construction and maintenance, forcing
drivers of gasoline-powered vehicles pick up the tab.59
3. Cross-Subsidies Are Not Necessarily Bad Policy
However, evidence that net metering programs and existing electricity
rate designs are creating cross-subsidies among utility customers would
not necessarily mean that such policies are undesirable. Indeed, basic
microeconomic theory teaches that subsidies can be a valuable tool for
promoting economic efficiency when tailored to address positive externality
problems that might otherwise lead to a sub-optimally low quantity of
some socially valuable activity.60

edition/2012/03/16/ utilities-solar-users-dont-pay-enough.html?page=all (quoting a
spokesperson for Pacific Gas & Electric Co. as being “concerned that there is a cost shift
and those customers are not paying their fair share” of transmission and distribution costs);
Ian Clover, Utilities in several US states plan ways to make solar customers pay more, PV
MAG.
(Sept.
24,
2013),
available
at
http://www.pvmagazine.com/news/details/beitrag/utilities-in-several-us-states-plan-ways-to-make-solarcustomers-pay-more_100012824/#axzz3JonYME3V (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (quoting
Arizona Public Service Co. spokesman as justifying proposed rate reforms on the ground
that “[e]veryone who’s using the grid ought to pay their fair share”).
58. See Amy Joi O’Donoghue, Critics wants lights out on net-metering bill,
DESERET NEWS (Feb. 24, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865597293/
Critics-wants-lights-out-on-net-metering-bill.html?pg=all (describing Utah State Senator
Curt Bramble’s comparison between solar energy users and electric car drivers).
59. See id.
60. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 86 (10th ed. 2014) (explaining positive
externality problems and how such problems may be addressed through Pigouvian subsidies).
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Laws intentionally creating direct and indirect subsidies have existed
for decades, promoting everything from basic research61 to home ownership62
to charitable donations.63 Governments use tax revenues to support a wide
range of subsidies.64 Tax-funded subsidy programs result in cross-subsidies
from the broad base of all taxpaying citizens to those citizens engaged in
certain, subsidized activities such as homeownership or charitable giving.
Sometimes, subsidy programs facilitate rent seeking behavior and unwarranted
wealth transfers to undeserving special interest groups.65 However, many
subsidies are not the product of rent seeking and appear to do much to
correct market failures and promote the social welfare.
In fact, cross-subsidies have long existed within electric utility rates and
many electric utilities have deliberately embedded cross-subsidies into
their pricing for decades. For example, some utilities offer special discounted
rates to certain commercial or industrial electricity users as a means of
enticing them to relocate into their territories.66 Numerous utilities also
facilitate cross-subsidies to low-income customers through various incomebased rate discount programs.67 So long as such differential pricing is not

61. See Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture, and the Taxation
of High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 218–19 (1993) (describing externalities as a
common justification for basic research and development).
62. See Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax Expenditures, 50 U. LOUISVILLE
L. REV. 643, 655 (2012) (explaining that “proponents of the mortgage deduction argue that
home ownership creates positive externalities” and that “[t]his is the most common justification
for continuing the mortgage interest deduction” under federal income tax law).
63. See David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us About
Taxation?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 293S, S320 (2008) (stating that “charitable donations have
a positive externality (they help the recipient as well as provide utility to the donor) and,
therefore, might be subsidized” on that ground).
64. See Walter F. Dodd, The Growth of National Power, 32 YALE L.J. 452, 454
(1923) (“The income tax amendment, by giving to the national government a large
additional source of revenue, has made it possible for the nation to embark upon a system
of subsidies to the states, through which the nation has come to a large extent to determine
state policies as to education, highway construction, and other matters”).
65. See Jason Brennan, The Right to Good Faith: How Crony Capitalism
Delegitimizes the Administrative State, 11 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 317, 328 (2013) (explaining
that a “firm engages in rent seeking when it tries to manipulate the political environment
for its own benefit” and adding that rent seeking is a “socially destructive” practice).
66. See Charles F. Phillips, Jr., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, REGPU CH
10, 2005 WL 998372, 97 (1988) “[T]here are special discount rates; rates that have been
proposed and adopted (often on an experimental basis) that are commonly known as ‘incentive’
or ‘economic development’ rates. Such rates ‘are designed both to promote increased
sales to existing industrial customers and to attract new firms to a utility’s service
territory’” but “raise issues of undue discrimination”).
67. See STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10:17 (34th ed. 2014)
(providing a comprehensive review of low-income electric rate discount programs in the
United States).
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“unreasonably discriminatory”, it is generally permissible in most
jurisdictions. 68
In addition to the intentional cross-subsidies just described, incidental
cross-subsidies have likewise existed within utilities’ electricity pricing
since the earliest years of the regulated utility model. To illustrate this
idea, consider Ann and Beth—two hypothetical residential utility customers
receiving electricity service from a common utility company. Suppose
that Ann lives about one mile from a large natural gas-fired power plant
that generates most of her utility’s supply of electricity. A single distribution
line carries that power directly from the power plant to Ann’s home. In
contrast, Beth lives more than 100 miles away from the power plant, so
the electricity she uses must traverse tens of millions of dollars’ worth of
grid infrastructure before reaching her residence. Assuming that Ann and
Beth pay identical retail rates and fees for their electric power, Ann subsidizes
Beth’s use of the electric grid—Beth arguably doesn’t pay her “fair share”
of the costs of maintaining it. And yet, such cross-subsidies have been an
accepted reality for regulated electricity pricing for generations. It would
be nearly impossible to price electricity so as to perfectly avoid such
cross-subsidization,69 so utilities seldom characterize these sorts of crosssubsidies as unfair.
Given that subsidies can sometimes be valuable policy tools and that at
other times they are very costly to avoid, case-by-case analysis is required
to determine whether any particular policy creating a subsidy is justifiable.
In the case of distributed solar energy, the proper question is not an ambiguous
one about whether the alleged cross-subsidies associated with policies
supporting distributed solar energy are “fair.” Instead, decision-makers
should be asking whether these policies are a justified means of furthering
important social goals.
Policies benefiting distributed solar energy arguably do advance a
legitimate policy goal: they address a positive externality problem and
68. See Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle
Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 164
(2014) (“If classifications are reasonable, disparity in rates may exist between different
classes of customers and, typically, industrial, residential, commercial and municipal
customers pay different rates for their services”) (citations omitted).
69. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer has emphasized the inherent
imprecision associated with utility rate setting. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 47 (“It is clear that setting a rate of return cannot, even in principle, be reduced
to an exact science . . . and suggestions of a proper rate—carried out to several decimal
places—give an air of precision that must be false”).
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thereby promote more optimal levels of investment in rooftop solar
energy. Solar energy generation is widely recognized as creating benefits
that are not easily captured by producers of that energy. For example, a
recent study focused on APS territory concluded that the benefits of
distributed solar generation in that region actually exceeded its costs by
more than 50% because it reduced peak demands while helping the utility
to comply with state renewable portfolio standard requirements.70 Solar
energy generation also displaces demand for fossil fuel-generated power
and the adverse environmental impacts associated with it—additional
benefits that ordinarily cannot be fully captured by generators of solar
power.71 In the absence of any government intervention, this positive
externality problem is likely to result in a sub-optimally low quantity of
solar energy production.72 Policies that directly or indirectly subsidize
solar energy generation to encourage more of it can be a useful means of
helping to correct that market failure.73 Accordingly, policymakers have
used federal investment tax credits and other programs to aggressively
subsidize renewable energy development for nearly a decade.74 There is
no obvious reason why a subsidy to solar energy users is any less fair when
it results from net metering programs and volumetric electricity rates than
when it is administered more directly through tax credits or similar means.
A more legitimate policy concern associated increasing rooftop PV
installations and existing policies is the risk that this combination could
ultimately drive utilities into insolvency—the death spiral scenario
highlighted above.75 Reductions in the reliability or quality of electricity
service under such a scenario could impose widespread economic losses
70. See R. Thomas Beach & Patrick G. McGuire, SEIA/Crossborder Energy: The
Benefits And Costs Of Solar Distributed Generation For Arizona Public Service at 2, available
at http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/resources/AZ-Distributed-Generation.pdf (last visited
Nov. 24, 2014) (concluding that “the benefits of [distributed generation] on the APS
system exceed the cost, such that new [distributed generation] resources will not impose
a burden on APS’s ratepayers . . . The benefits exceed the costs by more than 50%, with
a benefit/cost ratio of 1.54”).
71. See Diana S. Power, Solar Power Begins to Shine as Environmental Benefits
Pay Off, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2013 (describing numerous environmental benefits of
PV-generated power as an alternative to coal-generated electricity).
72. See Rosen, supra note 60, at 106 (explaining that, “[w]hen an individual or firm
produces positive externalities, the market underprovides the activity or good, but an
appropriate subsidy can remedy the situation”).
73. Id.
74. See Zachary Scott Simmons, Subsidizing Solar: The Case for an Environmental
Goods and Services Carve-out from the Global Subsidies Regime, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 422, 432–38 (2014) (Providing a detailed summary of the recent cadre of
aggressive subsidy programs directed at promoting solar energy, beginning with the 30
percent federal Investment Tax Credit instituted under the Energy Policy Act of 2005).
75. Supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
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and may thus be worthy of policymakers’ attention. Inventive policies are
needed to facilitate the growth of distributed generation technologies
while promoting a smooth and non-disruptive transition away from
centralized power. Unfortunately, rhetoric fixation on fairness among
customers can make it difficult to focus on these more genuine policy
challenges.
B. Unfairness Toward Low-Income Utility Customers:
The Regressivity Argument
Another common fairness-based argument against net metering and
existing rate design is that such policies are income-regressive, creating
wealth transfers from low-income customers to high-income ones. Such
regressivity-based unfairness claims have surfaced in multiple states in
recent years in debates over solar-related utility policy reforms.76 These
claims combine the cross-subsidy concept described above with assumptions
about the socioeconomic status of solar-using utility customers. In essence,
the argument is that cost barriers prevent lower-income customers getting
rooftop solar panels, leaving them no option but to pay ever higher utility
rates for conventional power as wealthier customers go solar.77 As one
utility representative summarized it:
Low-income customers can’t put on solar panels—let’s be blunt. . .So why
should a low-income customer have their rates go up for the benefit of someone
who puts on a solar panel. . .?78

Do potential wealth distribution impacts create a compelling reason to
reform net metering programs and rate designs in response to the growth
of distributed solar energy? On the one hand, although market prices of
76. See, e.g., Melissa Powers, Small is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy
Policies to Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595,
647 (2012) (“[U]tilities have raised populist arguments in which they characterize net
metering policies as wealth transfer mechanisms that force poorer ratepayers to
subsidize the renewable energy proclivities of wealthier ratepayers”); Monica Martinez,
The Poor Shouldn’t Have to Bear the Cost of Solar Power, FORBES, June 13, 2014
(opinion) (arguing that solar net metering results in an “unfair cost shift” from low-income
families to high-income families).
77. See Powers, supra note 76, at 655 (“Since wealthier customers will typically
install distributed generation systems, but the costs of supporting distributed generation
are shared among ratepayers, this may appear to be an unfair wealth transfer”).
78. Diane Cardwell, Solar Panel Payments Set off a Fairness Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2012, at B1.
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rooftop PV and other distributed energy systems have declined precipitously
over the past decade, such systems still remain out of reach for many
residential consumers.79 Solar leasing companies such as SolarCity and
SunRun have helped to expand the accessibility of distributed solar energy
to some customers with lesser means.80 Still, even these companies generally
require that customers have solid credit histories and stable incomes to
qualify for their products.81 Since lower-income customers are less likely
to go solar and be beneficiaries of any purported cross-subsidies associated
with it, net metering and some other pro-solar utility policies arguably
could be characterized as income-regressive.
On the other hand, investing in solar PV systems is less financially
appealing to low-income customers in much of the country because of the
significant rate discounts that are available to these customers based on
their income levels.82 For example, in APS territory in Arizona, a family
of five with an annual household income of nearly $42,000 can qualify
for rate discounts between 26 percent and 65 percent.83 In contrast, a
recent study by Berkeley Labs determined that even if a hypothetical
utility in the Southwestern United States was to fill 10 percent of its
electricity demand via solar energy, utility rates in that jurisdiction would
likely increase by only 2.5 percent.84 Such a modest rate increase would
79. See Christine Tusher, Everything You Need to Know About Adding Solar Panels
At Home, FORBES, May 17, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/houzz/2014/05/17/everythingyou-need-to-know-about-adding-solar-panels-at-home/ (noting that, nationwide, the average
up-front cost (after tax credits and other subsidies) for a residential solar energy system
was about $17,000).
80. See Gabriel Schnlitzler, Clean Tech Opportunities in Green Building Legislation, 5
AM. U. BUS. L. BRIEF 42, 49 (2008) (describing how “financing innovations from companies
such as SunRun and Solar City. . .try to reduce up front solar installation costs by making
sales to consumers via power purchase agreements and equipment leases”).
81. See Jonathan Fahey, Can you go solar? Leases and loans make it possible, USA
TODAY, Oct. 12, 2014 (noting that SolarCity’s solar lease and loan plans “generally
require[] a high credit score” and that “SolarCity will only lend to those with a credit score
of at least 680”).
82. See FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, § 10:17 (providing
a comprehensive review of low-income electric rate discount programs in the United States).
83. To review the discounts available to lower-income residential customers in APS
territory, visit the APS limited income home web page at http://www.aps.com/en/ residential/
accountservices/assistanceprograms/pages/limited-income-home.aspx (last visited Nov. 24,
2014) (providing that a household of five individuals with a total household income of no
more than $3,489 per month (or $41,858 per year) could qualify for discounts on electricity
of between 26% and 65 percent under the APS Energy Support Program).
84. See Andrew Satchwell, et al., Financial Impacts of Net-Metered PV on
Utilities and Ratepayers: A Scoping Study of Two Prototypical U.S. Utilities, BERKLEY
LAB: ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND POLICY GROUP at 29 (Sept. 2014), available at http://
emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/LBNL%20PV%20Business%20Models%20Report_no%20rep
ort%20number%20(Sept%2025%20revision).pdf (At 10% PV penetration . . . average retail
rates for the SW utility are 0.35 cents/kWh (2.5%) higher than without PV”).
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barely begin to offset the massive cross-subsidies for which low-income
customers already qualify.
Moreover, utilities can often mitigate the potential income distribution
effects of net metering and volumetric rate structures without sacrificing
solar-friendly utility policies. For instance, utilities with such concerns
can simply increase the magnitude of their rate discounts to lower-income
customers.85 Utilities can even help to fund such additional discounts by
adopting Oregon’s policy of contributing unused net metering credits to
low-income assistance programs.86
Ironically, some utilities’ proposals to reform net metering policies or
rate designs affecting distributed solar energy could ultimately harm lowincome customers. As some advocacy groups have recently pointed out,
these sorts of reforms could ultimately drive greater numbers of solarusing customers to leave the electric grid entirely and use distributed
energy storage systems for backup power.87 Such an exodus would only
increase the long-term cost burden on lower-income customers who
remained connected to the grid.
Reforms that weakened the policy incentives for distributed solar
energy could also help to perpetuate energy-related environmental
injustices that often disproportionately victimize low-income populations.
For example, low-income citizens are more likely to live near coal-fired
power plants, nuclear power facilities, oil refineries, and other locales
made less desirable because of adverse impacts of conventional energy
production.88 Net metering, volumetric electricity rates, and other utility-

85. At least one scholar has noted this possibility. See Power, supra note 76, at 655
(“Even among residential customers, several states offer low-income payment assistance
and lifeline rates designed to provide affordable electricity services for poor customers. Thus,
maintenance of these rate design strategies should mitigate the possibility of wealth
transfer”).
86. See OR. REV. STAT. § 757.300(3)(d) (2013) (providing that “any remaining
unused kilowatt-hour credit accumulated during the previous year shall be granted to the
electric utility for distribution to customers enrolled in the electric utility’s low-income
assistance programs” or used in certain other limited ways set forth in the provision).
87. See Herman K. Trabish, The fight over solar moves from net metering to rate
design, UTILITY DIVE (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-fight-oversolar-moves-from-net-metering-to-rate-design/327742/ (describing how groups such as
AARP and the NAACP opposed Madison Gas & Electric’s proposed increase in fixed
customer fees because of feared impacts on lower-income customers).
88. A 2012 NAACP report highlights this problem. See Adrian Wilson, et al., Coal
Blooded, NAACP 15 (2012), http://www.naacp.org/page/-/Climate/CoalBlooded.pdf (last
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related policies that promote renewable energy arguably help to limit these
injustices as well.89
Finally, some economists would argue that policymakers should not
even consider income distribution effects when structuring net metering
and electricity rates. As Professors Shavell and Kaplow have observed,
weighing wealth distribution impacts in these contexts tends to result in
unnecessary economic distortions. In their words:
[W]hen legal rules do have distributive effects, the effects usually should not be
counted as favoring or disfavoring the rules because distributional objectives can
often be best accomplished directly, using the income tax and transfer (welfare)
programs. One reason economists have tended to favor these direct means of
redistribution is that they reach all individuals and are based explicitly on income.90

Put differently, reforming net metering policies or redesigning electricity
rates on account of wealth distribution impacts is generally inefficient and
undesirable from the perspective of all socioeconomic classes. For all of
the aforementioned reasons, such impacts are not viable grounds for reforming
existing utility policies in response to the growth of rooftop solar power.
C. Unfairness Toward Utilities and Their Investors: The
“Breach of Regulatory Contract” Argument
One other type of fairness argument that might be leveled against solarfriendly utility policies is that such policies are unfair to investor-owned
utilities and their shareholders. Unsurprisingly, utilities tend to make this
argument more sparingly. Citizens tend to be less inclined to sympathize
with corporations and investors than with ordinary utility customers. In
truth, policies that promote the growth of distributed renewable energy
probably create greater financial risks for utilities than for their customers
or anyone else.91
Regulated electric utilities have long been viewed as having an implicit
contract with state regulators. Under this contract—which is commonly
visited Feb. 3, 2015) (finding that “coal power plants tend to be disproportionately located
in low-income communities”).
89. See Jeanetta Williams, Net metering is fair, benefits all communities, LAS VEGAS
SUN, Oct. 12, 2014, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2014/oct/12/net-metering-fair-benefitsall-communities/ (Local NAACP leader arguing in favor of solar-friendly utility policies
on the ground that the “costs of continuing on the fossil fuel-dependent paths are
disproportionately borne by low-income communities and communities of color” but that
“the development of clean energy sources, such as solar, provides an opportunity to improve
the health and well-being of everyone”).
90. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 49, at 993–94.
91. See Satchwell, et al., supra note 84, at 60 (“Compared to the impacts on
ratepayers, the impacts of customer-sited PV on utility shareholders are potentially much
more pronounced”).
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referred to as a “regulatory contract”92—utilities generally must provide
power to all parties within their designated geographic territory and must
only charge rates approved by their state’s regulating entity.93 In return,
utilities have historically enjoyed legally protected monopoly status within
their assigned territories94 and rights to charge electricity rates sufficiently
high to generate reasonable financial returns.95
Utility policies that support the growth of distributed solar energy
arguably threaten both of the promised benefits that utilities have historically
enjoyed under their implicit contract with state regulators. First, such
policies help a powerful disruptive technology to erode away at utilities’
monopoly power within their designated territories. Net-metered solar energy
users compete directly with conventional utilities, displacing customer demand
in an already-tepid electricity market that utilities have long occupied
almost entirely on their own.96 From the perspective of some utilities,
policies supporting a new market entrant—distributed solar energy—
might seem to contravene regulators’ implicit promise of monopoly
franchise protection.

92. Professors Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spurber helped to popularize the regulatory
contract concept by publishing a book that employs the phrase in its title. See generally J.
GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY
CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED
STATES (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
93. This “duty to serve” is a common thread in utility regulation generally and
frequently extends to water utilities and other utility entities. For a more detailed discussion of
the concept of a duty to serve, see generally Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve”
and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1248–50 (1998) (summarizing the history of the “duty to serve”
in utilities law).
94. Electric utilities have enjoyed such exclusive franchise rights since the earliest
days of the electricity grid. See id. at 1265 (describing Samuel Insull’s historic formation
of the Chicago Edison utility and attainment of an exclusive franchise for a designated
geographic territory in connection with that enterprise).
95. To review the basic principles and theories of cost-based utility rate regulation,
see generally FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
60–65 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2006) (describing utilities’ typical rights to charge “just
and reasonable” rates, which seek to allow a utility to cover its costs and earn a reasonable
rate of return).
96. See John Kemp, Integrated approach needed to U.S. electricity policy, REUTERS
(Nov. 24, 2014, 5:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/24/us-usa-electricitycarbon-kemp-idUSKCN0J522Z20141124 (reporting that “North America’s peak electricity
demand is forecast to increase by just 1 percent a year for the next decade, the slowest rate
of growth on record”).
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Distributed solar-friendly utility policies can also cut indirectly into
utilities’ earnings and jeopardize utilities’ ability to generate reasonable
and predictable returns on their investments. As net-metered PV systems
become more prevalent and more cost-competitive with conventional
electricity, utilities’ historically stable earnings are likely to decline.97
Most net metering programs require utilities to effectively purchase any
excess electricity generated by their customers’ energy systems, often at
retail rates that are significantly higher than the rates that utilities generally
pay for wholesale power.98 For obvious reasons, these mandated purchases
can significantly soften utilities’ earnings outlooks and increase the risk of
substantial stranded costs—investments in infrastructure that utilities are
ultimately unable to fully recover from customers.99
In the eyes of utilities, state regulators’ policy support of a distributed
solar energy industry that is bringing unwelcome changes to conventional
utility markets may feel like an “unfair” breach of their regulatory contract.
Language released by FERC in the context of wholesale electricity
deregulation nearly 20 years ago encapsulates this type of appeal to fairness:
Utilities have invested billions of dollars in order to meet their obligations. Those
investments have been made under a “regulatory compact” whereby utilities—
and their shareholders—expect to recover prudently incurred costs. With the
advent of competition, even prudent investments may become stranded. Reliance
on past contractual and regulatory practices must be recognized and past investments
must be protected to assure an orderly, fair transition to competition.100

Unfortunately, utilities tend to overlook one important fact when making
this sort of unfairness claim: their regulatory contract was never intended
97. See Satchwell, et al., supra note 84, at 26–27 (describing two separate mechanisms
for how the growth of distributed PV can reduce utility shareholder earnings and
estimating that a 10% market penetration of customer-cited PV would cause a hypothetical
southwestern United States utility company to suffer earnings decreases of approximately
5.7%).
98. See Steven Ferrey, et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon
Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
125, 186–87 (2010) (“Net metering can pay the eligible renewable energy source
approximately four times more for this power when it rolls backwards at the retail rate than
paid to any other independent power generators for wholesale power, and much more than
the time-dependent value of this power to the purchasing utility”).
99. See Herbert Hovencamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory
Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801, 802–03 (1999) (defining stranded costs as “investments in
specialized, durable assets that may have seemed necessary, or at least justifiable,
when constructed and placed into service under a regime of price and entry controls but
that have become underutilized or even useless under deregulation”).
100. FERC PROPOSED REGULATIONS, 32,514, Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities (proposed Mar. 29, 1995),
18 C.F.R. Part 385, 60 F.R. 17662, 2013 WL 4290204 (C.C.H.) (2013) (italics added).
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to include a perpetual guarantee of protection against disruptive innovation.101
Facilitating the growth of rooftop solar energy is fundamentally different
from allowing a new utility company to construct a utility-scale power
plant and distribution infrastructure within an incumbent utility’s territory
and begin selling grid-supplied power there. The rooftop solar energy
industry is a competitive threat borne of valuable and rapidly advancing
technologies that have the potential to transform how the world produces
and distributes electricity. A duty to shield utilities from this sort of
innovation was never contemplated as falling within the regulatory contract.
To quote one pair of scholars:
Historical precedent clearly shows that when emerging conditions create a critical
tension between upholding social welfare objectives and upholding continuity of
a utility for its own sake, courts will decisively favor social welfare objectives
and markets play no favorites. Indeed, neither regulators nor courts can ultimately
protect regulated utilities from all competition, even when—perhaps especially
when—the character of that competition challenges the viability of their fundamental
business model.102

For similar reasons, utility shareholders have also assumed risks associated
with disruptive innovation. The average return on investment for equity
shares in utility companies is a bit lower than that of the stock market
generally,103 but it is significantly higher than that available from investments
in treasury bills or other very-low-risk assets.104 Part of the reason that
utility stocks have historically generated comparatively higher returns is
that there are additional risks associated with these investments, including
the risk that disruptive innovation could render utilities obsolete. In short,
as threatening and frustrating as the growth of the distributed solar energy
101. Other scholars have emphasized this idea. See, e.g., Graffy & Kihm, supra note
1, at 27–28 (asserting that “utilities have no constitutional protection against competitive
impacts” and that “even low-risk companies cannot expect to remain low-risk indefinitely
and may shift into higher risk status in surprisingly short periods of time given sufficiently
disruptive conditions”).
102. Graffy & Kihm, supra note 1, at 16.
103. See Larry Swedroe, Should You Invest in Utility Stocks?, CBS NEWS (Oct. 3,
2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/should-you-invest-in-utility-stocks/ (last visited Nov.
25, 2013) (reporting that, “[f]or the 85-year period 1927–2011, the total stock market provided
an annual average return of 11.6 percent, with an annual standard deviation of 20.5 percent.
Utilities produced a slightly lower annual average return of 11.3 percent”).
104. See id. (explaining that, “[f]or many, safe bond investments no longer generate
the interest income they need to meet expenses” and that “[t]his is causing them to take on
incremental risk in their search for greater yields” such as through “investing in utility
stocks”).
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industry may seem in the eyes of utility executives, state policies tailored
to facilitate such growth neither constitute an unfair breach of the regulatory
contract nor necessitate reforms to existing net metering programs or rate
designs.
V. FAIRNESS ARGUMENTS CAN CUT BOTH WAYS
All of this discussion of fairness begs one additional question that
should not go unmentioned: what if the actions of utilities were subjected
to the same fairness lens they have used to critique distributed solar energy
policies in recent years? Appeals to fairness are often characterized as a
double-edge sword.105 To the extent that investor-owned utilities insist on
talking about solar energy-related policy issues in terms of fairness, they
might reasonably anticipate having fairness arguments directed back at
them. The strategies that some investor-owned utilities have employed in
responding to distributed solar energy technologies arguably offend notions
of fairness more than any of the purportedly unfair aspects of net metering
or existing rate designs.
A. Should Regulated Utilities Be Permitted to Compete in the
Private Rooftop Solar Energy Market?
Consider, for example, a few regulated utilities’ recent proposals to directly
compete within the private rooftop solar energy industry. Arizona’s APS
utility has proposed such a plan, seeking state regulators’ permission to
install solar PV arrays on 3,000 homes within its territory pursuant to a
new rooftop leasing program. 106 Under the APS proposal, residential
customers who participated in the program would receive a $30 monthly
credit on their electricity bills—an amount greater than the monthly $5 to
$10 savings that a typical APS customer can earn through arrangements

105. See, e.g., Mark Klock, Is it the Will of the People or a Broken Arrow? Collective
Preferences, Out-of-the-Money Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for Quashing PostBalloting Litigation Absent Specific Allegations of Fraud, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 27
(2002) (“[F]airness is a double-edged sword”); MARVIN KOHL, THE MORALITY OF KILLING
17 (1974) (“[F]airness is a double-edged sword”) (cited in Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide
and the Competent Terminally Ill: On Ordinary Treatments and Extraordinary Policies,
74 OR. L. REV. 539, 559 n.105 (2005)); James B. Zagel, Drug Rhetoric, Courts, and the
Law: A Response to Professor Rudovsky, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275, 277 (1994) (“. . .
fairness cuts both ways. . .”); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1190 n.52 (2007) (“. . . fairness cuts both ways . . .”).
106. To learn more about the APS rooftop solar proposal, see http://www.aps.com/
en/ourcompany/aboutus/investmentinrenewableenergy/Pages/azsun.aspx?src=azsun (last
visited Nov. 25, 2014).
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with private solar leasing companies in that state.107 Tucson Electric
Power, another Arizona utility, has proposed a similar sort of plan.108
Some solar energy industry advocates have contended that it would be
unfair to allow regulated utilities to compete in private rooftop solar
markets. Regulated utilities enjoy the unique benefits of state-protected
returns on investment and consequent access to comparatively low-cost
capital—special government-provided benefits that are simply unavailable to
private solar energy companies.109 Any proposal permitting regulated utilities,
armed with these advantages, to enter into private rooftop solar markets,
would instantly create an uneven playing field tilted in utilities’ favor. In
the words of one solar energy industry spokesperson:
This latest tactic by APS has a ‘Trojan horse’ smell to it. Our member companies
welcome fair and equal competition, but this move would stack the deck in favor
of a company which can rate-base solar with a guaranteed rate of return. How is
that fair?110

As with the other fairness-based arguments examined in Section IV
above, accurately assessing the merits of this unfairness claim requires
identifying and more carefully analyzing the argument at issue. In this
instance, the purportedly unfair policy is to permit an entity enjoying
special government benefits as a regulated utility to operate in a competitive
market—one that is not prone to the sort of market failures that ordinarily
justify such regulatory protections.
Natural monopoly problems tend to arise in markets in which
producers’ cost structures are such that a “single firm can take advantage
107. See Ryan Randazzo, APS wants to put free solar panels on 3,000 homes,
AZCENTRAL.COM (JUL. 28, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/
07/28/aps-wants-put-free-solar-panels-homes/13299121/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (reporting
that, when customers lease panels from SolarCity, “their new, lower power bills combined
with the lease payments bring about $5 to $10 a month in savings for customers”).
108. See Robert Walton, Tucson Electric Power proposes new utility-owned rooftop
solar program, UTILITYDIVE.COM (Aug. 20, 2014), available at http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/tucson-electric-power-proposes-new-utility-ownedrooftop-solar-program/299840/ (last
visited Dec. 4, 2014) (describing Tucson Electric Power’s proposal and quoting a solar
energy industry advocate contending that the utility was “trying to go into a completely
new market and compete on an unlevel playing field in a market that’s already served by
competitive forces”).
109. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
110. Stephen Lacey, Arizona Public Service Enters the Rooftop Solar Business:
Good for Installers or a Trojan Horse?, GREENTECHMEDIA.COM (July 30, 2014), available
at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/arizona-public-service-enters-the-rooftop-solarbiz (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
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of economies of scale and supply the entire industry output, at least for a
sizable region.”111 Conventional power distribution is highly vulnerable
to natural monopoly problems because of the very high up-front costs
associated with it. Regulators have long addressed this vulnerability
through the familiar regulated monopoly model described above.112
Producers in the market for residential rooftop solar products do not
face the exceptionally high up-front capital costs and steeply declining
average cost functions faced by regulated utilities. The barriers to entry
into the rooftop solar market are far lower than for centralized utility-scale
electricity generation and distribution. These lower barriers to entry have
allowed a competitive and well-functioning market for rooftop solar
leases and installations to emerge in recent years.113
Given the absence of a natural monopoly problem in the rooftop solar
energy market, there is no legitimate policy justification for allowing
regulated utilities to compete in it. For the same reasons that regulated
utilities are not permitted to open retail stores and sell table lamps or ceiling
fans, utilities should not be permitted to directly compete against private
companies that sell or lease rooftop solar products. Regardless of whether
policies allowing utilities to enter the rooftop solar market would be
unfair, they would be bad policy.
B. Should Regulated Utilities Be Permitted to Fund Campaigns
Aimed at Protecting Their Monopolies Against
Disruptive Innovation?
Some within the solar industry have also criticized investor-owned
utilities in recent years for leveraging their financial and political prowess
to protect their own interests at the expense of their customers. As mentioned
above, electric utilities typically enjoy exclusive franchise rights and
regulated pricing designed to ensure reasonable investment returns.114
However, they also generate profits for private shareholders and can thus
have company-specific interests that are markedly different from the
prevailing interests of their customers. Should regulated utilities be permitted
to spend millions of dollars on political activities aimed at protecting their
own interests and delaying the impacts of disruptive innovation?
111. Rosen, PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 60, at 315.
112. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
113. See Robert McIntosh & James Mandel, Why Solar Installers are Becoming
Vertically Integrated, CLEANTECHNICA.COM (July 19, 2014), http://cleantechnica.com/2014/07/
19/5-reasons-solar-installers-integrating-vertically/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (“The solar
installation market is still very large with a lot of small players. The barriers to entry are
low; any electrical contractor can get the parts and equipment to make installations”).
114. See generally supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
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As distributed solar energy becomes more prevalent and utilities seek
regulatory approvals or reforms aimed at responding to these new
technologies, utilities can be tempted to contribute to campaigns aimed at
swaying political forces in their favor. For example, in 2013, the parent
company of the Arizona utility APS spent roughly $3.7 million on
advertising and lobbying associated with its proposal to impose monthly
fees on users of solar power.115 Ultimately, APS won approval to impose
the nation’s first-ever fees on solar users. These fees make the purchase
or lease of rooftop solar panels less financially rewarding for customers
in APS territory, thereby helping to shield APS from this increasingly
threatening form of market competition.
The fact that APS won approval to impose special fees on solar energy
users may be startling to some, given the long history of subsidies aimed
at promoting solar energy. However, this outcome was fully consistent
with basic public choice theory: highly regulated entities, like APS, are
permitted to fund campaigns for their own rent-generating proposals and
tend to have sizable advantages over the general public in the political
process.116 APS had much to gain from commission approval of its proposal,
which gave the utility a new revenue stream. In contrast, the costs associated
with the proposal will be diffusely spread among thousands of APS customers
who favored solar energy-friendly policies but faced collective action
problems in banding together to oppose this sort of measure.
From the early beginning of the regulated utility model, commentators
have similarly warned of its vulnerability to “regulatory capture.” 117
Regulatory capture occurs when a well-organized group or entity exerts
influence over government legislative or regulatory processes to advance
115. See Nichola Groom, Arizona sets precedent for solar systems with monthly fee,
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-11-14/news/sns-rt-ussolar-arizona-20131114_1_net-metering-solar-customers-aps (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
116. See Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 77,
90 (2009) (“Government institutions . . . are prone to capture by special interests that have
an incentive to obtain concentrated benefits by imposing diffuse costs on the general
public. There is thus a depressing tendency for institutions, programs, and laws designed
to regulate particular industries to become captured by those very same groups, which then
modify the law over time for their own benefit regardless of the costs to the public or other
interests”).
117. See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1614, 1635 (2014) (“[E]arly proponents of public utility were well aware of the
problems manifest in the actual practice of utility regulation. They recognized that rent
seeking, regulatory capture, and overinvestment posed important challenges to the success
of public utility regulation”).
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its own interests at the expense of the general public.118 The risk of regulatory
capture is heightened in contexts where a regulated entity has repeated
and prolonged interactions with a specialized regulating body. 119 Utility
regulation perfectly fits this description since utilities’ fortunes are heavily
dependent upon succeeding in their repeated interactions with the state
public utility commissions.
In many states, public utility commissions are comprised of only a small
handful of commissioners, each wielding significant influence over the
regulation of utilities within the state. Facing the threat of distributed solar
energy—a disruptive innovation that could undercut utility profits in the
short run and radically transform the entire electricity industry in the long
run—utilities increasingly have much at stake in these elections. The
political leanings of public utility commissioners can matter a lot to utilities
that are seeking reforms to net metering or rate designs in response to
distributed energy growth.
Given the growing importance of public utility commissions to the
financial well-being of utilities in this new era of distributed solar energy,
it is thus hardly surprising to see possible signs of regulatory capture as
utilities increasingly lean on the state regulatory system to shield them from
the market impacts of distributed solar energy. For instance, APS recently
drew attention for allegedly contributing large sums of money to indirectly
aid the election campaigns of public utility commissioner candidates and
an attorney general candidate in Arizona.120 Such “dark money” funding
118. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture,
and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013) (“Capture describes situations
where organized interest groups successfully act to vindicate their goals through
government policy at the expense of the public interest”).
119. See id. (“For groups that are repeat players before specialized agencies,
investments in long-term relationships can have substantial returns in terms of influence,
raising capture concerns.”).
120. Multiple news articles have mentioned that APS was widely suspected to have
given heavy financial backing to Arizona Corporation Commission candidates Tom
Forese and Doug Little and to Arizona attorney general candidate Mark Brnovich in the
states’ 2014 midterm elections. See, e.g., Mike Sunnucks, APS- Backed Republicans take
ACC seats, AG’s office, PHOENIX BUS. J. (Nov. 4, 2014, 9:43 PM MST), http://www.
bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2014/11/04/aps-backed-republicans-take-acc-seats-doingwell.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (“Arizona Public Service Co. and its parent
company. . .were big backers of Republicans Tom Forese and Doug Little, who won the
race for two Arizona Corporation Commission seats); Ryan Randazzo, Republicans
Forese, Little win Arizona Corporation Commission race, AZCENTRAL.C OM (Nov. 4,
2014, 9:40 PM MST), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/11/04/arizonacorporation-commission-election-night/18427899/ (“APS is widely believed to have contributed
to the independent groups that supported Forese and Little and ran $1.3 million in negative
ads against Democrat Sandra Kennedy as well as primary opponents of Forese and
Little.”); Laurie Roberts, Secret campaign to elect Forese/Little nears $1 million,
AZCENTRAL.COM (Aug. 2, 2014, 1:43 PM MST), http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-
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strategies, which are supposedly permissible under certain conditions after
the Supreme Court’s famed Citizens United decision,121 seemed to pay off
for APS in this instance: all three of the candidates that purportedly
benefited from indirect APS financial contributions ultimately won their
election bids.122 In the week leading up to the election, one local newspaper
columnist reporting on the issue questioned:
Is APS trying to buy not only the commission that regulates it but all the big state
offices? Is APS making a secret bid to essentially run this state using money
supplied by you and me when we pay our electric bill?123

Some might characterize it as “unfair” for heavily-regulated utilities to
indirectly contribute large sums of money toward the election campaigns
of the state officials who regulate them.124 However, it seems more
fruitful to disregard notions of fairness when examining such activities
and analyze them instead under principles of welfare economics and
public choice theory. In that light, the hazards of allowing this practice
are plain to see. Heavily regulated utilities—including investor-owned
utilities—are primarily intended to serve the public.125 Such highly regulated

ed/laurieroberts/2014/08/01/corporation-commission-dark-money-race/13493677/ (“Save
Our Future Now and the Arizona Free Enterprise Club are both widely suspected in the
political community of being front groups for Arizona Public Service” and that “the two
groups ha[d] spent a jaw dropping $885,000 in their independent campaign to try to get
Forese and Little onto the Corporation Commission”).
121. See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See also John P. Sarbanes & Raymond O’ Mara III, Foreword, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
1, 14 (Winter 2014) explaining that the “entrance of “Super PACs” and “dark money”
outside spenders” was “made possible by Citizens United and subsequent lower court
rulings”).
122. See Sunnucks, supra note 120.
123. Laurie Roberts, Who is secretly spending $15 million to win your vote?,
AZCENTRAL.COM (Oct. 29, 2014, 11:19 AM MST), http://www.azcentral.com/story/laurie
roberts/2014/10/29/dark-money-spending-in-arizona-tops-15-million/18081207/.
124. For example, a bill was recently introduced in Congress entitled the “Fair
Elections Now Act” that sought to promote more “fair” elections by subsidizing certain
types of private campaign contributions through matching rules with a goal of helping
candidates to compete on a more equal playing field. See generally Fair Elections Now
Act, S. 1285, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110s1285/text. Likewise, an agency in California with the term “fair” in its name—the Fair
Political Practices Commission—regulates election fundraising activities in that state.
C ALIFORNIA ’ S F AIR P OLITICAL P RACTICES COMMISSION AND ITS R ESPONSIBILITIES ,
available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/index.php?id=2 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
125. See Nicole Fox, et al., CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM: PUBLIC UTILITIES, 73B C.J.S.
PUBLIC UTILITIES § 13 (2014) (“The theory behind the regulation of public utilities is the
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entities should not be permitted to exert heavy influence over the political
process in matters that directly and substantially affect them. Legal rules
that neglect to limit the influence of heavily regulated bodies in these
political activities substantially increase the risk of costly regulatory
capture problems like those highlighted above.126
VI. CONCLUSION
If the past decade’s dramatic growth is any indication, rooftop solar
energy and other distributed energy technologies are poised to drastically
transform the electricity industry in the coming century. Given the nation’s
heavy reliance on electricity, there is much to be gained from ensuring
that this is a smooth and efficient transformation. Many of the policy
challenges associated with this transition remain unresolved and significant
uncertainty lies ahead. Academics and policymakers are only beginning
to grapple with the difficulties that will face the electricity sector as it
wades through this historic shift toward cleaner and more distributed
energy sources. However, one thing seems reasonably clear: descriptive,
straightforward debate that is free from fairness rhetoric is more likely to
lead decision-makers to the ideas and policies necessary to support a
sustainable energy future.

protection of the public and the assurance of adequate service on one hand, and on the
other, a fair opportunity to the utility to secure, by business economy, a reasonable return
from such services, but the primary purpose is to serve the interests of the public and not
to establish a monopoly or to guarantee the security of investment in a public utility”).
126. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
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